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ABSTRACT 
 
Real-Time Processing of a Long Perimeter Fiber Optic Intrusion System (April 2008) 
 
William Timothy Snider 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Christi K. Madsen 
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering 
 
This thesis reports on recent advances made in real-time intruder detection for an 
intrusion system developed at Texas A&M University that utilizes a phase-sensitive 
optical time-domain reflectometer.  The system uses light pulses from a highly coherent 
laser to interrogate a length of buried optical fiber.  The Rayleigh backscattered light is 
detected, and a FPGA-based system is used to implement real-time signal processing 
algorithms.  With the introduction of real-time signal processing, the system can run 
continuously, only triggering intrusions when they are detected.  These recent advances 
allow for more effective processing of intruder signatures, while still giving results 
comparable to previous off-line signal processing results.  With these advances, this 
technology is a prime candidate for low-cost perimeter monitoring of high-value and 
high-security targets, such as nuclear power plants, military bases, and national borders. 
  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
I would like to give special thanks to Dr. Christi Madsen for her valuable guidance.  
Coming into this project my knowledge of fiber optics was limited, but I have learned a 
great deal through research and meetings with her.  I would also like to acknowledge the 
late Dr. Henry Taylor for his invention of the φ-OTDR system and his work to make it a 
reality.  His work laid the foundation for this research project. 
 
Portions of this research were conducted as part of the 2007 Research Experience for 
Undergraduates (REU) Program at Texas A&M University.  Funding for this program 
was provided by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and Department of Defense 
(DoD). 
 
  v 
NOMENCLATURE 
 
φ-OTDR Phase Sensitive Optical Time Domain Reflectometer 
EM Electromagnetic 
FFT Fast Fourier Transform 
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array 
MS/sec Million Samples per Second 
PZT Piezoelectric Cylinder 
RF Radio Frequency 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Security systems are widely used today, with the goal of detecting unwanted intruders.  
These systems can range from the simple to the elaborate, but the overall philosophy is 
to provide “appropriate and cost-effective protection for building occupants” [1].  
Traditional security systems, including seismic sensors, cameras, motion detectors, and 
fences, have limited range and several drawbacks.  They are deployed above ground, 
allowing for them to be seen and giving the intruder a chance of dodging detection.  
Power support is also required, which could be challenging in remote locations.  Long 
perimeters increase the number of components necessary, adding to the overall 
complexity of the system.    
 
A distributed fiber optic perimeter sensor, as shown in Fig. 1, offers several advantages 
over traditional perimeter monitoring technologies.  A single cable allows for monitoring 
along its length for tens of kilometers, with the possibility to extend to hundreds of 
kilometers through the use of fiber amplifiers.  Access is only needed to one end of the 
fiber to place the laser and detectors.  This is beneficial, because it is not necessary to 
backtrack the buried fiber in order to gain access to the opposite end.  Additionally, 
_______________ 
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intrusions can be localized to a specific point along the length of fiber.  The United 
States-Mexico border stretches 1,952 miles, and in 2004 there were 1.1 million 
apprehensions along the border [2].  The range and resolution of a fiber optic sensor 
makes this technology a good candidate for border surveillance.  On a smaller scale, this 
technology can be used to monitor the entire perimeter of an embassy, military base, 
power plant, or other high profile target. 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Schematic for a distributed fiber optic intrusion sensor.  Sketches of the backreflected signal are 
shown on the lower portion of the diagram. 
 
 
A distributed fiber optic intrusion system consists of a buried length of optical fiber 
monitored from a central location.  Having a buried fiber reduces the ability to tamper 
with the system, there is no emanation from the fiber that can be detected, and optical 
communication is not susceptible to electromagnetic (EM) or radio frequency (RF) 
interference [3].  The sensor necessary for the detection of intruders has already been 
developed in previous research at Texas A&M University [4].  The pressure and seismic 
waves of an intruder on the ground interact with the buried fiber to produce a phase 
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change in the backscattered light.  A phase-sensitive optical time domain reflectometer 
(φ-OTDR) detects these phase changes and represents them as amplitude changes.  
Developed software tracks these amplitude changes over time, allowing for the 
realization of intrusions. 
  
This research involved the continued development of the fiber optic intrusion sensor.  In 
order for a security system to be practical, it must have real-time intrusion detection 
capabilities.  Instant notification of potential intruders is necessary if they are to be 
stopped.  For this project, a field programmable gate array (FPGA) was used to achieve 
real-time signal processing.  In order to increase sensitivity, a highly coherent laser was 
also used.  Field tests at Texas A&M University’s Riverside Campus were conducted to 
determine the effectiveness of new real-time signal processing algorithms in triggering 
intrusions. 
 
This thesis focuses on the development of a real-time signal processing algorithm, which 
brings the buried fiber optic intrusion system one step closer to real-world 
implementation.  In the remaining chapters, the background for the development of the 
signal processing algorithm, the experimental procedure used for analysis, results, 
conclusions, and recommendations for future work will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Texas A&M University received a patent on the “Apparatus and method for fiber optic 
intrusion sensing” in 1993 [4].  The basic foundation for an intrusion system exists, with 
current research focusing on making advances in real-time intruder detection.  This is a 
key component for any intrusion system, as it does no good to receive notification of an 
intruder once they have already had time to escape. 
 
Phase sensitive OTDR 
The φ-OTDR is the backbone of this system, as it provides a means to detect the changes 
in backscattered light caused by an intrusion.  Optical time domain reflectometers 
(OTDR) were first demonstrated for use in fiber optic sensing over two decades ago [5].  
The φ-OTDR measures phase changes, as opposed to attenuation changes with the 
traditional OTDR, making it orders of magnitude more sensitive to perturbations along 
the fiber [4, 6, 7].  The block diagram for the φ-OTDR can be seen in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 2.  Block diagram for φ-OTDR.  EDFA=erbium doped fiber amplifier, BPF=bandpass filter, 
PBS=polarization beam splitter, PD=photodetector, ADC=analog-to-digital converter, and FPGA=field 
programmable gate array. 
 
 
A highly coherent laser with a stabilized center frequency is used to introduce pulses of 
light into the optical fiber.  A modulator is used to break the continuous output from the 
fiber laser into 2μs pulses of light.  The pulse period is chosen to be longer than the time 
required for the optical pulse to propagate the length of the fiber and the Rayleigh 
backscattered signal to be completely detected, which is 120 μs in the test setup.  By 
using a pulse period of 150 μs, it is ensured that there is no overlap of consecutive 
pulses, and therefore no overlap of data. 
 
Fiber amplifiers are used at various points in the system to increase the power 
transmitted down the fiber and the power of the Rayleigh backscattered light.  Since the 
pulse is introduced and the Rayleigh backscattered light monitored from the same end of 
the fiber, an optical circulator is used to separate the signals.  The backscattered signal is 
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split into two channels using a polarization beam splitter to optimize the probability of 
detection [8]. 
 
Data acquisition and processing over two channels is handled by National Instrument’s 
PCI-7831R FPGA card with LabVIEW software control.  In order to connect the system 
outputs to the FPGA, it is necessary to use an analog-to-digital converter. 
 
Field programmable gate array 
Continuous real-time signal processing is desired in order to monitor the buried optical 
fiber for intrusions.  Programs developed in LabVIEW running in Windows are not able 
to keep up with the incoming data, and within several seconds are already lagging.  This 
is because traditional LabVIEW programs run in Windows have a maximum loop rate of 
1 kHz.  Using a FPGA, it is possible to run loop rates up to 40 MHz.  This significant 
increase in speed allows for the realization of real-time signal processing algorithms. 
 
National Instrument’s LabVIEW software is widely used in industry to develop scalable 
test, measurement, and control applications.  Previously, hardware utilizing a FPGA 
required understanding and using bit code to program it, which the average engineer 
does not know.  Through the use of LabVIEW’s FPGA Module, their standard graphical 
interface can be used to program the FPGA device, and then LabVIEW handles the 
compilation of the necessary bit code.  This allows the average engineer to design 
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custom hardware for a specific task [9].  For this project, National Instrument’s PCI-
7831R FPGA card was used, which can be seen in Fig. 3. 
 
 
Fig. 3.  National Instrument’s PCI-7831R FPGA card.  The FPGA allows for high frequency loop rates. 
 
 
One drawback with the FPGA is that it is limited to integer operations only.  This 
limitation has a major impact on filter design.  While LabVIEW provides a way to 
convert filters into fixed point filters, the conversion is never exact, and sometimes gives 
a completely different frequency response.  For this project, a filter was designed with a 
close enough match to the desired frequency response. 
 
Riverside test facility 
Field testing was conducted at Texas A&M University’s Riverside Campus, where 44 m 
of optical fiber are buried in clay soil at depths of 8-18 inches below the surface.  A 
room located next to the buried cable contains the laser and detection equipment, with 
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the fiber passing through conduits in the wall.  The fiber layout at the Riverside test 
facility can be seen in Fig. 4. 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Layout of fiber burial at Riverside.  The conduits in the wall that the fiber passes through are also 
shown. 
 
 
A paved road that carries automobile traffic runs next to the field, approximately 21 m 
from the fiber at its closest location.  There is also a small dirt road that provides access 
to the indoor laboratory, which runs 4 m from the fiber at its closest location.  These 
roads, which can be seen in Fig. 5, allow for testing vehicular intrusions. 
 
 
  
Fig. 5.  Overall layout of test site at Riverside Campus. 
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CHAPTER III 
INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
LabVIEW software was used to program the FPGA to trigger the modulator to create the 
optical light pulses, continuously acquire data, process the data, and monitor the system 
for intrusions.  Data is acquired at a rate of 1.5 MS/sec over two channels. 
 
Intrusion location 
Localization of intrusions along the length of the buried fiber is possible, and 
demonstrated in Fig. 6.  Two consecutive periods of the backreflected signal are 
overlapped, with the difference between them shown.  Knowing the time into this period 
that the difference occurs and the speed of light in the fiber, the location of the intrusion 
along the length of fiber can be determined. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Plot showing two consecutive pulses of the backreflected signal.  Note that taking the difference 
between them allows for localization of intrusions. 
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Because of memory constraints on the FPGA, the entire length of optical fiber cannot be 
monitored for intrusions.  In the test setup, only a short (44 m) section of fiber is buried, 
which can be treated as one point.  As can be seen in Fig. 4, the buried fiber is located 
after a 2 km reel of fiber, so the area of interest is the 2 km point in the fiber.  The pulse 
is introduced into the fiber at time t = 0, travels 2 km to reach this point in the fiber, and 
then the backreflected signal travels 2 km back to the detector.  Therefore, the light must 
travel a total of 4 km, and the time required can be calculated by knowing the speed of 
light in the fiber, as shown in equation (1). 
 
(1) 
 
The sampling rate is 1.5 MS/sec.  Knowing the time necessary for the optical signal from 
the 2 km point to reach the detector, the sample point to isolate out of each period can be 
determined, as shown in equation (2). 
 
(2) 
 
Therefore, to monitor the 2 km point in the fiber, the 35th sample out of each period 
should be isolated.  By isolating and comparing this data point over time, intrusions at 
the 2 km point can be detected. 
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This same premise can be used to monitor any location along the length of fiber.  
Equations (1) and (2) can be used to correlate a data point with any distance along the 
fiber.  By isolating this data point, intrusions can be realized for that location. 
  
Real-time signal processing 
All signal processing is handled by the FPGA, which allows for real-time intrusion 
detection.  A filter is used to remove noise, and then each data point is compared against 
a pre-programmed intrusion criterion as it is received.  When the intrusion criterion is 
met, an intrusion signal is triggered. 
 
The FPGA is programmed to constantly maintain a 10 second buffer of data.  Once an 
intrusion signal is triggered, a timestamped data file is created, and the buffer 
immediately transferred into it.  An additional 20 seconds of real-time data is added to 
the file.  At the end of this time frame, the software resets itself, and waits for another 
trigger.  The buffer and record times are both fully adjustable.  In the case of an intrusion 
being triggered before the buffer has a full 10 seconds of data, the buffer is transferred to 
the data file, and enough real time data added to make a 30 second file. 
 
Simulated intrusion 
Before testing with actual intrusions, a piezoelectric cylinder (PZT) was used to confirm 
proper system calibration.  The PZT has fiber wrapped around it and is located at the 2 
km point, before the fiber exits through the conduit in the wall to be buried in the field.  
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By applying a controlled voltage to the PZT, the fiber is stretched and produces a phase 
shift.  This allows for the creation of a simulated intrusion that can be duplicated. 
 
With the program running, the PZT was used to create and record a simulated intrusion.  
The resulting signal can be seen in Fig. 7.  Getting a signal confirms that the FPGA is 
triggering the laser pulse and acquiring data.  In order to confirm that the correct data 
point out of each period is being isolated, the program was adjusted to isolate the data 
points on either side.  In both cases, there was a 40% reduction in signal strength for the 
PZT intrusion, confirming data point isolation. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Simulated intrusion created by the PZT at 2 km point along the fiber. 
 
 
Triggered intrusion 
After using the PZT to confirm proper program calibration, a real intrusion was made in 
the field.  With the program running and waiting for an intrusion to trigger it, the test 
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field was walked.  The triggered intrusion can be seen in Fig. 8.  The first footstep is 
seen 10 seconds into the data file, which is due to the 10 second buffer that the program 
maintains.   
 
 
Fig. 8.  Triggered intrusion file created by a human intruder on foot. 
 
 
 
The software ends up creating a log of all the intrusions that have been triggered while it 
is running, and saves data files that can be viewed later for further analysis.  A separate 
program is capable of plotting these files, giving the plots that are seen in the above 
figures.  Note that both the raw and processed data is saved over two channels.  Saving 
the raw data allows for more advanced signal processing algorithms to be run off-line if 
desired. 
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CHAPTER IV 
INTRUSION SIGNATURE COMPARISON 
 
In 2007, a paper was published on this intrusion system that gave detailed intrusion 
signature analysis for multiple intrusion types [10].  These results were obtained using 
off-line signal processing algorithms.  While these are not real-time results, they do give 
a basis of comparison for the real-time results. 
 
Single human intruder on foot 
A single person walking across the buried cable can be seen in Fig. 9.  The top plot (a) 
shows previous off-line results, while the bottom plot (b) shows results obtained with 
real-time FPGA signal processing. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Comparison of results from a human intrusion.  Plots show a) Off-line data processing and b) Real-
time FPGA data processing. 
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Individual footsteps are clearly identifiable in both cases.  For the real-time intrusion, the 
field was walked at an angle, resulting in crossing directly over the buried fiber twice.  
This is confirmed in the plot, with the larger amplitude spikes resulting from being 
directly over the fiber.  The FPGA real-time results are comparable to the off-line 
results, and real-time signal processing is desired. 
 
It does appear that there is slightly more noise in the real-time processing case, which is 
probably due to the integer filter design.  In the LabVIEW integer filter conversion, the 
integer filter did not exactly match the desired frequency response. 
 
Vehicular intrusion 
A 2004 Ford Ranger was used to make a vehicular intrusion, which can be seen in Fig. 
10.  The off-line intrusion signature was created with a four door compact car.  The top 
plot (a) shows previous off-line results, while the bottom plot (b) shows results obtained 
with real-time FPGA signal processing. 
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Fig. 10.  Comparison of results from a vehicular intrusion.  Plots show a) Off-line data processing and b) 
Real-time FPGA data processing. 
 
 
 
A traveling car produces a continuous disturbance while the vehicle is within range of 
the buried optical fiber, with the amplitude of the disturbance being proportional to the 
distance from the fiber.  Again, the FPGA real-time results are comparable to the off-line 
results, and real-time signal processing is desired. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
A highly sensitive φ-OTDR system capable of detecting intruders near the vicinity of a 
buried fiber optic cable in real-time has been developed.  Current research has focused 
on real-time signal processing algorithms to detect intruders and record their activity, 
utilizing a FPGA-based system.  Field testing has shown successful results for 
monitoring one location along the length of fiber for intrusions.  Real-time results were 
comparable to previous off-line signal processing results.  The scalability of real-time 
signal processing over the entire length of fiber is limited by the amount of memory 
available on the FPGA unit. 
 
Future work 
Detection capability along the entire length of fiber is desired.  The current program is 
capable of detecting intruders along the entire length of fiber, but can only monitor and 
record one location at a time.  In the current program, this location is determined by a 
user defined input.  Research is being done to scale up the software to give intrusion 
triggering and recording capabilities along the entire length of fiber. 
 
Future research will also focus on developing next generation signal processing 
algorithms to improve the signal-to-noise ratio and to allow for instant classification of 
intruders.  There is a lot of information to be mined from the raw data received by the 
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detectors.  The current signal processing algorithm looks at the amplitude of the 
processed signal in triggering intrusions.  It is believed that differences in frequency 
contribution can be isolated for intruder classification.  This would be a desired feature 
for any security system. 
 
This technology has demonstrated advanced sensing capabilities for low-cost perimeter 
monitoring.  Numerous commercial and military applications exist for this technology in 
monitoring high-value and high-security targets.  With the addition of several more key 
features, this technology will be ready for real world implementation. 
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